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Twenty years after the proclamation of independence in 2006, Montenegro faces a bitter reality: a project once presented as a triumph of freedom and a European future has transformed into a deeply corrupt, demographically crippled, and ethnically fragmented state. Instead of becoming a modern, prosperous, and united nation, Montenegro under the long rule of the DPS and its successors has become a textbook example of a captured state in the Balkans, where corruption, mafia patterns, nepotism, and systematic divisions have become the dominant features of social and political life. This anniversary does not celebrate success, but rather reveals the structural failure of a political experiment that has brought more harm than benefit to a large portion of its population.
The 2006 referendum, which formally paved the way for independence, was never a truly democratic process. With a narrow 55.5 percent vote in favor — exactly at the threshold imposed by the international community — the referendum was marked by numerous documented irregularities: manipulation of voter lists, pressure on state employees, vote-buying, and media dominance by the pro-independence bloc. The decisive role was played by national minorities, primarily the Bosniak and Albanian Muslim populations, who voted overwhelmingly for separation from Serbia. In this way, minorities — rather than the majority Orthodox population — effectively decided the fate of the state. This paradox has left a deep sense of illegitimacy among a large number of Serbs and Montenegrins who identify with Serbian national and cultural identity, creating a lasting wound at the very foundations of the new state.
After the referendum, Milo Đukanović’s DPS masterfully applied the “divide and rule” policy. The party systematically deepened divisions among Orthodox Christians by artificially constructing a conflict between “true Montenegrins” and “Serbs.” Changes to textbooks, the imposition of a new language, historical revisionism, and open confrontation with the Serbian Orthodox Church were all part of a long-term strategy to fragment the Orthodox majority. While the Orthodox population was deeply divided and pitted against itself, Muslim communities enjoyed significant privileges: political protection, easier access to public positions, financial support, and tolerance for their specific demands. This selective ethnic policy created a sense of discrimination among parts of the majority population, while minority loyalty was purchased through privileges, allowing the DPS to maintain power for decades.
The economic and institutional balance sheet of independence is devastating. Instead of the rule of law and economic prosperity, Montenegro became synonymous with a mafia state. High-level corruption, nepotism in which families, godfathers, and party cadres of the DPS systematically divided state resources, tenders, privatizations, and loans led to the capture of nearly every segment of society. Organized crime — from cigarette smuggling to drug cartels — became deeply intertwined with political structures. Infrastructure projects such as the controversial highway demonstrated how public debt accumulated alongside massive corrupt margins, while citizens paid the price through poverty and lack of perspective.
The most tragic indicator of failure is the demographic and social reality. Instead of young people building the new state, they are leaving Montenegro en masse. The emigration of the working-age population, especially university-educated youth, has reached the scale of an exodus. Low birth rates, population aging, empty villages, and the depopulation of entire regions testify to a profound crisis of confidence in the country’s future. A state that cannot retain its own youth is condemned to long-term decline.
Twenty years later, Montenegro increasingly resembles a small Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ethnic and identity-based divisions, instead of fading, are becoming deeper and more institutionalized. Weak central authority, clientelism, ethnic voting, and mutual distrust among the three main communities (Montenegrins, Serbs, and Muslim peoples) create conditions for chronic political paralysis and instability. Without a strong reintegration of society on civic and cultural foundations — rather than ethnic ones — Montenegro will continue to sink into the Bosnian model of dysfunction: divided, poor, and without a clear perspective.
This anniversary should not be celebrated, but used as a mirror for confronting past mistakes. Independence did not bring liberation; it institutionalized divisions, corruption, and demographic collapse. The future of Montenegro depends on whether its citizens will have the strength to overcome the inherited divisions or continue repeating the mistakes that have led it to this sad state. Unfortunately, current trends offer little reason for optimism.
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