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The snap parliamentary elections held on 25 October 2026 entered history as the moment when a long-entrenched political system finally collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions. The student list “Students Win” achieved a decisive and absolute victory. According to data from the Republic Electoral Commission, with nearly 98 percent of polling stations processed, the list secured approximately 52.7 percent of the vote — more than 2.26 million ballots — giving it around 140 seats in the 250-member Assembly. The list “Aleksandar Vučić – United Serbia” finished at roughly 39.2 percent, or just under 1.69 million votes, translating into about 104 seats. Turnout reached a record high in Serbia’s contemporary history — close to 69 percent. Vučić conceded defeat relatively early that evening, confronted with facts he could no longer relativize.
This outcome did not emerge overnight. It was the result of a prolonged erosion of public trust that culminated after the tragedy of 1 November 2024 in Novi Sad. The collapse of the concrete canopy at the railway station claimed sixteen lives. That event did not remain an isolated technical incident. It became a symbol of everything that had been simmering beneath the surface for years: opaque deals, poor oversight, clientelism, and a systemic absence of accountability. The student protests that followed — faculty blockades, mass marches, weekly moments of silence — lasted nearly two years. They began as a demand for justice for the victims and ended as a political movement that toppled one of the most entrenched regimes in contemporary Europe.
When I examine the defining features of Vučić’s rule, I see a system built on duplicity. He consistently presented himself as a patriot, a guardian of national interests, and a man defending Serbia against external pressure. In reality, his policy toward Kosovo and Metohija moved in the direction of gradual and quiet surrender. The Brussels Agreement, and later the Ohrid Agreement of 2023, de facto placed Serbs in the north of the province in an increasingly subordinate position. They enabled deeper integration of institutions under Priština’s control and narrowed the space for any serious defense of Serbian interests. While publicly speaking about the protection of the Serbian people and Christian heritage, in practice he pursued an agenda that progressively handed over an ancient Serbian and Christian land in the heart of Europe to the Albanian majority. This was not a policy of defense. It was a policy of accommodation and gradual abandonment of what the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia continues to treat as an integral part of the state’s territory.
The second pillar of that rule was corruption that had grown into a system. Instead of the state suppressing crime and organized groups, a network was created in which political and business structures often functioned as a single entity. Major infrastructure projects became arenas for opaque contracts, questionable contractors, and an absence of real quality control. The Novi Sad tragedy was merely the most visible and bloodiest consequence of this style of governance. Sixteen lost lives were not the price of an individual’s mistake, but the price of a system in which accountability almost never reached the right addresses. Citizens recognized this. Students articulated it more clearly and persistently than anyone else.
The third element of Vučić’s rule was foreign-policy double-dealing. Publicly, friendship with Russia was maintained, sanctions were rejected, and talk of a strategic partnership continued. At the same time, through intermediaries — the Czech Republic, Poland, and other countries — Serbian weapons and ammunition flowed in large quantities toward Ukraine. According to estimates that appeared in international media, the value of these deliveries was measured in hundreds of millions of euros. Vučić defended this as purely commercial exports to third countries, claiming he was not interested in what happened to the goods afterward. Such an approach enabled short-term balancing between East and West, but in the long run it exposed a lack of firm principles. While publicly posing as a friend of Moscow, in practice he participated in a supply chain that ran counter to Russian interests. This was not shrewd diplomacy. It was a policy that spent credibility on both sides.
In contrast, the Student List clearly defined its positions during the campaign. Kosovo and Metohija remain an integral part of the Republic of Serbia in accordance with the Constitution and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. Agreements that contradict the constitutional order will be revised, and those who signed them outside the Constitution should bear responsibility. Sanctions against Russia will not be imposed. Purchases of Russian gas will continue because this is a matter of energy security, not ideological loyalty. Arms exports to conflict zones, including sales to intermediaries who forward them to Ukraine, will be halted. A determined fight against corruption and organized crime has been announced, along with the return of institutions to citizens rather than party structures.
Particularly striking is the symbolism that accompanied the student movement. At the final rallies, Serbian and Christian elements dominated — flags, crosses, national motifs, and appeals to historical and spiritual heritage. This was neither coincidence nor folkloric decoration. It was a deliberate message that values long left only in rhetoric, while a different policy was pursued in practice, were being restored. At a time when many movements in Europe wander between globalist agendas and empty populism, Serbian students demonstrated that it is possible to combine the demand for clean institutions with a clear national and cultural identity.
These elections are not merely a change of government in Belgrade. They represent a break with the model in which national rhetoric served as a cover for practical concessions. The Student List arrives with clearer red lines regarding territorial integrity and foreign-policy consistency. With Vučić’s departure, no solid pillar of patriotic Europe or America is lost. What leaves is a man whose system long eroded institutions, public trust, and the moral capital of the state. Anyone who spoke for years about sovereignty while in practice pursuing a policy of accommodation was not a defender of interests, but their manager under conditions that personally suited him.
The 25 October 2026 marks a turning point in Serbia’s contemporary history. The country has been given an opportunity to return to a firmer definition of national interests, more responsible governance, and a clearer relationship toward its own history and territory. The student movement is not perfect, nor has it had time to fully institutionalize itself. Yet it succeeded in what no one had managed for a long time — toppling a system that appeared impregnable. Whether this opportunity will be used depends solely on those who have now obtained an absolute majority. As a historian who has been studying political processes in the Balkans for years, I consider this the most significant change since 5 October 2000. Not because it is perfect, but because a closed system of power that consumed the nation’s strength in order to sustain itself has finally been broken. Serbia now has a chance to breathe. It depends on the new majority whether that air will be clean or whether it will quickly become clouded again by old habits.
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