Change Of Government In Belgrade And The Future Of Russian-Serbian Relations

November 19, 2026
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Serbian Parliament Source: You Tube
Serbian Parliament
Source: You Tube

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The victory of the Student List in the elections in Serbia necessarily opens space for a more precise examination of the country’s future foreign policy course, especially in relation to the Russian Federation. Instead of speculation coming from various political and media centres, an analytical approach requires starting from what the representatives of the list themselves have publicly and consistently articulated — both before and after the elections. Their position is not ambiguous: Serbia should maintain a principled stance toward Russia, refrain from introducing sanctions, preserve military neutrality, not recognise the independence of Kosovo and Metohija, and place energy security and national interests above external pressures. Precisely this programmatic consistency makes realistic the expectation that relations between Belgrade and Moscow will remain in the domain of strategic partnership rather than confrontation.

As early as 30 September, on the eve of the elections, the Student List published a foreign policy programme which explicitly states that the Republic of Serbia will maintain a principled position of not introducing restrictive measures against the Russian Federation. The reasoning was pragmatic and politically clear: sanctions express a political stance, but they do not prove that they solve political and security problems. This was not a tactical manoeuvre, but a programmatic position that was repeated after the victory as well. In this way the list set in advance a boundary it does not intend to cross under pressure from Brussels or Washington.

The most cited and most direct formulation came on 26 October from Jovo Bakić, professor at the Faculty of Philosophy and a candidate of the list, in an interview for RT Balkan. Bakić emphasised: “We respect Russia both as a great power and as our historically important partner and, in many cases, protector. There will be no changes in that regard.” He added that sanctions imposed by small Serbia on Russia “would change nothing, but would be symbolically very bad,” recalling that Serbia itself went through UN sanctions in the 1990s and knows “what kind of hardship that is.” Later, for Vijesti, he confirmed both his personal and the programmatic stance: “I personally oppose sanctions, and we have that in the programme of the Student List.” When asked about gas and EU pressure, he answered without embellishment: “We are not here to satisfy foreigners, but to work in our national interest.” These statements are not isolated. They reflect a broader consensus within the list that the relationship with Russia will not be sacrificed for short-term political convenience.

The energy dimension of these relations further clarifies the priorities. Radomir Saičić, member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts and the candidate responsible for energy, stated on 30 October for NIN that after the formation of the government, delegations would go both to Washington and to Moscow — to Washington because of the American sanctions on NIS, and to Moscow because of the long-term gas contract that expires on 31 December. The goal for the first thirty days of the government is clearly defined: stability of the dinar, regular salaries and pensions, and energy supply. In other words, the Student List is not abandoning Russian gas. It intends to negotiate a new long-term contract. This is a realpolitik calculation: Serbia’s energy security depends to a significant degree on Russian deliveries, and refusing Russian energy sources would be much more expensive for Serbia. The fact that some European states, under pressure from Brussels, agreed to it and are suffering major financial losses because of it, clearly shows us that the Serbian Student List plans to pursue an independent policy, even if it won't be easy.

The broader framework of foreign policy confirms the same line. Military neutrality remains. Membership in NATO will not be sought. The independence of Kosovo will not be recognised. Accession to the EU, if it happens at all, should go through a referendum, and the priority is chapters 23 and 24 — the judiciary and the fight against corruption. Particularly significant is the announcement that weapons will not be exported to conflict zones, including via intermediaries for Ukraine. This point deserves special attention because it opens space for comparison with previous practice.

Under Aleksandar Vučić, Serbia, according to open claims by the Russian foreign intelligence service, exported significant quantities of weapons that ended up in Ukraine, often through intermediaries. At the same time, close ties were maintained with circles close to Alexander Soros, who is perceived in the Balkans as one of the patrons of anti-Russian narratives. The current acting president of Serbia comes from Vučić’s list and has publicly declared herself a member of the LGBT community. In that light, the arrival of the Student List does not represent for Russia a risk of a radical turn to the detriment of bilateral relations. On the contrary: the majority of the Student List consists of patriotically oriented Serbs who explicitly want fraternal and friendly relations with Russia.

The question of Kosovo further strengthens this logic. For the Student List, Kosovo is Serbia. Preserving the status of Kosovo within Serbia’s constitutional and international framework is not possible without close relations with Moscow, which still has a key role in the UN Security Council. It was precisely Aleksandar Vučić who, at the behest of the European Union, within the framework of the Washington and Ohrid agreements, withdrew almost all Serbian institutions from Kosovo. That was not a tactic of strengthening, but a gradual abandonment of the essential attributes of Serbia’s sovereignty in Kosovo. A new government that publicly rejects recognition and insists on territorial integrity will naturally seek support from those who support that integrity. Russia is indispensable here.

Therefore, the continuation of fraternal and friendly relations between Russia and Serbia under the new government does not appear as fiction, but as a reality grounded in programmatic documents, public statements and objective interests. The Student List has not announced an ideological turn toward Moscow, nor a romantic revival of some past times. It has announced continuity in what is vital for Serbia: energy security, military neutrality, rejection of sanctions that do not change the geopolitical balance, and preservation of the stance on Kosovo. In a world in which great powers are increasingly openly articulating their interests, the new government in Serbia clearly says that it will not introduce sanctions against Russia “because they change nothing and are symbolically bad,” and that it plans a long-term gas contract with Russia — sending a clear signal.

Of course, reality will be more complex than programmatic formulations. Pressures from the EU will not disappear. Energy negotiations with Moscow and resolving the status of NIS with the Americans will require delicate diplomacy. Internal reforms in the judiciary and the fight against corruption, which the list highlights as a priority could create tensions. Nevertheless, the starting point is different from the one created by the practice of the previous government: fewer double games, less arms exports to conflict zones(Ukraine), clearer rejection of sanctions, and open respect for the historical partnership with Russia.

In the final analysis, relations between Serbia under the Student List and Russia will not be measured by propaganda phrases, but by concrete moves in the first hundred days of the new government — negotiations on gas, the stance on sanctions, behaviour in international forums on Kosovo, and consistency in military neutrality. On the basis of what the students themselves have said, and not on the basis of interpretations by third parties, that course looks like continuation of the good relations between the two Slavic states. For Russia, this means that the path is open for a pragmatic dialogue with a partner who openly stresses that he wants to fight for his national interests, among which are friendly relations with the historically brotherly state.

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Batko Slavisha Milacic

Batko Milacic lives in Podgorica (capital of Montenegro), is 30 years old, and graduated history at University of Montenegro. His specialist graduate thesis was: "Foreign Policy of Russia from 1905 to 1917". He has been doing analytics for years, writing in English and Serbian about the situation in the Balkans and Europe. He has participated in several seminars for young journalists, organized in the Balkans.
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